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1.1.1. Function of pastoral governance and canonical penalties. The governance function of the 
sacred pastors includes the power to impose proportionate sanctions to protect relevant ecclesial values, 
when required by the common good of the Church. Canon 1311 §1, incorporating an affirmation already 
present in the former CIC and throughout the canonical tradition, proclaims: «The Church has the original 
and proper right to punish with penal sanctions the faithful who commit crimes». 
The qualifications “original” and “proper” indicate here, among other things, that it is not a right 
received from another human authority, nor from an imitation of legal systems alien to the Church. On the 
contrary, the aims that legitimize the existence of a penal system provided in every society (cf. CCC, 2266) 
are also found to be relevant in the Church, if one thinks of the responsibility of the sacred pastors. 
They have a duty to ensure the integrity of communion in the faith, in the cult and in the regime - 
essential elements of the common ecclesial good: that is to say, of the set of conditions necessary to make 
it possible to reach the aim of the Church - as well as other values of special human and Christian 
transcendence, protecting them, even coercively when necessary. Logically, the concrete manifestations of 
this dimension of the pastoral function of governance must always reflect the proper nature of the Church. 
1.2. Power and duty of the sacred pastors. The coercive power, for its own nature, entails at the same 
time a duty. Its exercise does not respond, naturally, to a reprehensible desire for revenge; nor does it imply 
a lack of understanding and mercy, nor does it presuppose the proud and distant attitude on the part of those 
who are considered unable to fall. On the contrary, it must be carried out with humility and gentleness, with 
paternal solicitude devoid of all arrogance, with prudent discernment and a keen sense of responsibility. 
With regard to this last aspect, we must not forget that it is not a juridical faculty of free authority, 
simply destined to expand the personal juridical sphere of its holder (as would happen with certain 
privileges, which could be exercised or not: cf., e.g., c. 80 §2), but of a public power which can not be 
renounced, belonging to the pastoral office, which is received with all the set of attributions proper to it as 
a necessary instrument - together with the other resources of pastoral charity - in order to effectively and 
responsibly fulfill the mission of governance, when certain circumstances occur. 
In all penal proceedings, one should always seek primarily to restore justice, that is, to attend to the 
spiritual and material wounds caused by the crime, eradicating or neutralizing their cause and repairing 
them, to the extent allowed by the juridical powers of the pastor (undoubtedly, other means can and should 
be used simultaneously or successively, which accompany and complement, but can not replace the 
prosecution - except in cases stipulated by the Legislator when this might be the required response). At the 
same time, efforts should be made to mend the culpable person, his salvation. Finally, one must also seek 
the reparation of the scandal - especially avoiding, not only among the faithful - the spread of doubts, 
ambiguities or confusion about the attitude of the Church with respect to certain behaviors that falsify her 
truth and hurt her image. 
For these reasons, "in the image of a Church that protects the rights of each faithful, and that - even 
more - promotes and protects the common good as an indispensable condition for the integral development 
of the human and Christian person, the penal discipline features positively: also the penalty imposed by the 
ecclesiastical authority (...) should be considered as an instrument of communion, that is, as a means to 
recover those deficiencies of the individual good and common good that have emerged with anti-ecclesial, 
criminal and scandalous behaviors of the members of the people of God "(John Paul II, Address to the 
Roman Rota, 1979). 
1.3. Penal action in the context of pastoral activity. Canon 1341 establishes that the Ordinary must 
initiate the process for imposing a penalty "only when he has seen that fraternal correction, reproof or other 
measures of pastoral solicitude is not enough” to achieve the aims mentioned above. The imposition of 
sanctions is thus considered a recourse of pastoral solicitude for especially serious situations.  In fact, the 
character of last resort, an extreme recourse that is attributed to penal law in all legal order assumes a 
specific intensity in canon law, derived from its pastoral character. 
However, "it is appropriate to pause to reflect on a misunderstanding, perhaps understandable, but 
no less harmful, that unfortunately and frequently conditions the vision of the pastorality of ecclesial law. 
This distortion consists in attributing scope and pastoral intentions uniquely to those aspects of moderation 
and humanity that can relate directly to the canonical equity, that is to say, it consists in sustaining that only 
the exceptions to the laws, the avoidance of recourse to processes and canonical sanctions, and the reduction 
of juridical formalities, really have pastoral importance. In this way, it is forgotten that justice and the strict 
laws, and therefore the general rules, processes, sanctions and other typical manifestations of legality, 
always necessary in the Church, are required in the Church for the good of souls and are therefore inherently 
pastoral realities" (John Paul II, Discourse to the Roman Rota, 1990). 
In fact, when situations arise that require by their nature a penal action, it is a manifestation of the 
commitment of the Good Shepherd to pursue it with prudent prudence, tempered strength, and justice 
quickened by charity towards God, towards his Church, towards the flock entrusted to him and towards the 
protagonist of the behavior perhaps criminal. The omission of that duty could even constitute a specific 
offense (cf. c.1989). 
It is, however, a field of extremely delicate pastoral responsibility, both for the effects of the measures 
adopted on specific people, and for their significance and possible public resonance. This, coupled with the 
fear of error, for lack of familiarity with the technical elements of canonical penal law in order to act in an 
adequate way, can in a number of cases foster an insecurity that leads to avoiding recourse to penal 
measures, even in situations in which the "other means of pastoral solicitude" mentioned in c. 1341 would 
constitute clearly an insufficient and inadequate response to tackle and heal the damage caused to the 
faithful - without excluding the delinquent himself - and to the Church.  
The observance of canonical provisions in this matter guarantees, to a large extent, to those who have 
received this responsibility, that their action would be upright, effective, proportionate, respectful of the 
dignity of the faithful and attentive to the value of the ecclesial good to be protected. This brief guide aims 
to facilitate the interpretation and application of penal law in the cases that require it. To this aim, it offers 
a synthesis of the main concepts and norms, and seeks to suggest appropriate ways of proceeding to protect, 
as far as possible, all the good at stake. 
 
2. THE DELICT AS NECESSARY PRESUPPOSITION OF THE PENALTY 
2.1. Distinction between sin and delict. Not every moral (sinful) or juridical violation is properly a 
delict. Only certain external behaviors with a special negative impact on the life of the Church and the 
faithful are qualified in law as a delict and punished proportionately, in accordance with the stated purposes 
(see 1.1 and 1.2). 
-   In order for a delict to exist: 
 An external violation of a law or precept is required (c.1321 §1). 
 That this external violation is gravely imputable to its perpetrator or perpetrators (ibid.). 
 That the violation committed is classified as a delict and punished with a penalty by a juridical 
norm (cf. c. 1321 §2). 
 
2.2. External violation of a law or precept (cf. cc 1315 and 1319, see 2.4). It is understood that a 
violation is external when it does not consist only of internal acts (thoughts, plans, desires, etc.), which have 
no juridical relevance, even though they may be morally reprehensible. 
- The external violation can be completed or not completed: 
- When, with the intention of committing an offense, acts have been carried out that by their very 
nature are aimed at achieving the criminal result, but the crime is not completed because of causes 
beyond the control of the perpetrator; this is a frustrated delict (cf. 1328 §1). 
- If the non-completion is due to the fact that the perpetrator did not use the appropriate means to 
achieve the intended criminal outcome, or that the person voluntarily desisted before reaching 
that result, this is an attempt to commit a delict (cf. 1328 §2). 
- In general, canon law punishes only completed delict. 
- Both the frustrated delict and the attempt can be punished with penalties lesser than that 
established for the completed delict, or with a penance or a penal remedy in its place (see 1328, 
1339-1340, see 3.3).  
 
2.3. Grave imputability. Having "imputability", in a juridical sense, means that the responsibility for 
a criminal conduct is formally attributable (i.e., as a delict, not only as material conduct) to its perpetrator 
(and co-perpetrators and accomplices, as provided for in canon 1329). 
 
2.3.1. Deliberation and voluntariness. In order for an imputable criminal conduct to be punishable, 
it is necessary, according to c. 1321 §1, that the imputability is grave. Therefore, it is punishable only if, to 
the extent that it is possible to determine externally, it can be established that the subject has acted with 
sufficient deliberation and voluntariness so that the imputability can be classified as grave (in practice, 
using criteria similar to those used by moral science regarding sin). 
 -  Those who habitually lack the use of reason, even if they have violated a penal norm while 
seemingly sane, are considered to be incapable of a delict (cfr. c. 1322). 
 
2.3.2. Intent and fault. A violation may be imputable by intent, which in the penal sphere means a 
deliberate intention to infringe upon the norm in question (not necessarily deception, as in other areas of 
law); or by fault, that is, by omission of due diligence (cf. 1321 §1). 
-    The penalty provided by the law for a violation applies only if the conduct was intentional. On 
the other hand, if the violation is by fault, it must be punished with a penalty lower than that 
foreseen (cf. 1321 §2). 
 
2.3.3. Circumstances that modify imputability. The CIC regulates a series of circumstances that 
modify the imputability: exemptions which do not incur any penalty (cc. 1323 and 1325); mitigating factors 
which allow for the imposition of minor punishments or substitute them by a penance (cc. 1324-1325); and 
aggravating factors which increase the penalty (c.1326). 
-  In addition, particular law may establish other factors that are extenuating, mitigating or 
aggravating. Penal precept may do the same (see 2.4), but only for the concrete case to which it 
refers (cf. c. 1327). These circumstances must be assessed at the time of imposing the penalty 
(usually not before, so that it could be recorded that the proceeding has been carried out according 
to the law: see 2.3.6; 8.3). 
 
2.3.4. Extenuating factors and penalties «latae sententiae». Penalties latae sententiae (see 3.1.1) are 
incurred when the requirements established by the law are imposed ipso facto on the person who commits 
the delict, without the need for any procedure for their imposition. However, the perpetrator would not 
incur these penalties when there is an extinguishing circumstance, as in other penalties, or a simple 
mitigating factor (cf. 1324 §3). 
  
2.3.5. Assumptions of ignorance that do not excuse. Canon 1325 explicitly establishes that crass, 
supine or affected ignorance, among others, are never extinguishing or extenuating circumstances. These 
are the three types of vincible ignorance that the subject does not overcome either by negligence, disinterest 
or malice (malicious ignorance is positively required because, in case of overcoming it, the subject could 
get to know exactly the obligations or prohibitions that he does not want to fulfill and prefers to ignore 
them). 
 
2.3.6. Time at which the extenuating and mitigating factors should be assessed. In general, except 
for obvious cases which exclude all imputability, it is preferable that these circumstances be assessed in the 
context of the corresponding penal process or proceedings (see 7 and 8) should it be initiated (see c. 1718) 
so that the acquittal or condemnation is carried out with the necessary guarantees.  
-   During the preliminary investigation (see 6) it is sufficient to determine whether the fact is, in 
principle, imputable; or, to put it in another way (more precisely in practice), if it is not clearly 
not imputable. It must be kept in mind that if the violation has been committed, the law presumes 
(unless it proves to the contrary) that it is imputable (cf. 1321 § 3), which would allow for criminal 
prosecution. However, this presumption of imputability does not imply a correlative presumption 
of fault (see 2.3.2), which must be proved in any case within the corresponding process or 
procedure. 
 
2.3.7. Cooperation of several subjects in the same delict. It is possible that, in addition to the principal 
perpetrator, other persons also participate in various forms and to varying degrees in the commission of a 
delict. Their involvement and the subsequent criminal consequences must be tried as resulting from the 
same prosecutions carried out to establish the penal situation of the principal perpetrator of a possible delict 
(see 6-8). 
 -  Although it is a doctrinal distinction not necessarily employed by the CIC in a strict sense, co-
perpetrators refer to those who conspire together and jointly carry out the same criminal action; 
while accomplices are understood as those who, through other forms of cooperation such as 
commanding, inducing or instigating, make the commission of the delict possible (if the crime 
could not have been committed without such cooperation), simply facilitate it (covert 
cooperation), or hide it, etc. 
-   The principle stated in this respect in the CIC is that all who cooperate in the commission of the 
delict with the same intention to commit a violation (although not for the same reasons) are also 
imputable or responsible for the same delict. Consequently, these co-perpetrators shall be subject 
to the penalties provided for by the law or penal precept, if they are expressly named in a law or 
precept; and if only the principal perpetrator is expressly named, to the same penalties provided 
for him, or to others of the same or lesser gravity according to the type and degree of his 
participation (cf. 1329 §1). 
-    In the case of penalties latae sententiae (see 3.1.1), if the co-perpetrators and necessary 
cooperators cannot receive the same penalty as the principal perpetrator (e.g. because they are 
laypersons and the prescribed penalty only affects clerics, etc.), they can be punished with other 
penalties ferendae sententiae (cf. 1329 §2). 
2.4. Typification: penal law and the penal precept. Properly speaking, one can only speak of a delict 
when the offense committed is classified as such and is punishable by a juridical norm (cf. c 1321 §2), 
which may be a penal law, universal or particular (c. 1315 ), or a penal precept (c. 1319). 
2.4.1. Penal law. According to c. 1315 §1, a person who has legislative power can issue penal laws, 
namely, laws that establish a penalty for a behavior that becomes delictual - becoming object of juridical 
definition as a delict - from that moment. 
-   Those with this power to issue penal laws within the limits of their competence: the Roman Pontiff 
and the Ecumenical Council united with its Head; the diocesan Bishop and his equivalents or assimilated 
in law; the particular Council; and the person who has received from the Supreme Legislator a delegation 
of the legislative power (cf. 135 §2).  
-   Both universal law and particular law (cf. cc 7-22) can establish penal behaviors ex novo; and also 
protect by a penalty what is already commanded or prohibited by divine law. Particular penal law (cf. 1315 
§3) may also establish the same, within the limits of its competence (always taking into account the criteria 
of cc. 1316-1318): 
• Reinforce with a penalty the mandate or prohibition established by a universal law.  
• Add penalties to those already established for a delict typified by universal law (although this 
should not be done without very grave necessity). 
• Determine or establish as mandatory a penalty that the universal law has left indeterminate (see 
c. 1315 §2) or has established as optional (see 3.1.2) or may, however, establish the penalty of 
dismissal from the clerical state, which is reserved to the assumptions determined by the 
Universal Legislator (c.1317). 
 
2.4.2. Penal precept. Unlike penal law, which comes from legislative power, penal precept comes 
from executive power (including cases in which the authority that issues it is also a legislator: e.g., a 
diocesan bishop). 
- Canon 1319, with an indirect expression, attributes the competence to issue a penal precept to 
anyone who can issue precepts in the external forum, in virtue of his power of jurisdiction: that is to say, to 
the executive authority who, according to the law, has the power and competence to impose upon a person 
or certain persons, for a particular case, the obligation to do or omit something, whether or not mandated 
by a prior law (cf. c. 49). That provision shall be penal if, at the same time when imposing or requiring the 
obligation in question, it also orders (i.e., threatens) with a penalty, always determinate (see 3.1.2), in the 
case of non-compliance. 
 2.4.2.1. Distinction between penal precept and penal decree. In the current system of canon law, in 
practice, the penal precept is always singular (cf. especially cc. 35-39; 48-58). However, it should not be 
confused with the so-called penal decree, since these concern two acts that refer to different and non-
interchangeable stages of penal proceedings. 
-  In fact, the penal decree (cf. cc. 1342, 1353) is the extrajudicial decree that imposes a penalty, at 
the conclusion of the proceeding indicated in c. 1720 (the administrative route for the imposition of 
penalties: see 7). It is also, as in the case of the penal precept, a singular administrative decree (given by 
virtue of the executive power); but if the penal precept has, one might say, a function analogous to penal 
law, the function of the penal decree is analogous to that of the penal sentence. 
-  So, the penal precept establishes or provides (constitutes) the penalty (as a means to strengthen the 
mandate it imposes); and the penal decree imposes or declares it (once it is proven that there has been a 
violation of a law or proper precept that established the penalty). 
 
2.4.2.2. Example of the various moments of the action of the authority. If a faithful is having a 
behavior that damages the life of the Church, or breaching an obligation already imposed by the law, the 
competent authority, after weighing the question (see cc. 1319 §2 and 1317), may require by means of 
precept that the person does or fulfills something within a specified period, warning him that, if he does not 
do so, he will incur the penalty established in the same precept (that was not previously foreseen in general 
by the law, for if it were, the precept would not be properly penal: the delict and the corresponding penalty 
then would not be established by the precept, but by the previous penal law, which the precept would be 
limited to urging). 
- If the indicated period elapses without fulfillment, the offender commits the delict established by 
the precept and is subject to the penalty established.  
- The authority must proceed correctly to impose that penalty, which is not generally “automatic” 
(i.e., not already imposed by the mere act of disobeying the precept). Normally, the procedure for the 
imposition of administrative penalties must be followed (cf. c.1720, see 7), abbreviating or omitting all 
those steps that may be unnecessary redundant, depending on the nature of the case and taking into account 
the juridical procedures already carried out. In any case, the right of defense of the offender must be 
carefully guaranteed. The procedure will conclude with a new decree issued under c. 1720 §2 which 
imposes the penalty. 
- The offender would only incur the penalty “automatically”, thus rendering the procedure for its 
imposition unnecessary, when the penal provision had provided for a latae sententiae penalty (see 3.1.1), 
something which should not be done unless it has to do with grave delicts (see 2.3.2) that are especially 
scandalous and difficult (cf. c. 1319 §2 and 1318). If this were the case, canonical doctrine already 
considered at the time of the 1917 Code that the precept itself would be equivalent to the previous warning 
which is necessary to validly impose a censure (cf. c. 1347) for that which the offender was legitimately 
threatened with a latae sententiae censor by precept and which would be subject to the penalty from the 
moment when the non-compliance occurred (see 3.1; 3.2). 
 
2.4.2.3. Scope and juridical limitations of the penal precept. According to current law, the penal 
precept: 
- Cannot impose or apply any penalty for past actions, but only threaten with it, that is, to establish 
in a singular case that a certain future violation will be punished with a penalty. 
 - Cannot perform normative functions of a general and abstract nature permitted by c. 1315 §3 to 
particular penal law. 
 - Cannot establish the penalty of dismissal from the clerical state that c. 1317 reserves to universal 
law (see 3.2.2.4). 
 - Cannot established perpetual expiatory punishments (cf. 1319 §1; 1314 §1, 2º, see 3.2). 
 -  Cannot establish indeterminate penalties (cf. cc 1319 §1; 1315 § 2; see 3.1.2). 
 -  Can establish censures (c. 1312 § 1, 1º), both ferendae sententiae and latae sententiae (cf. cc 1319 
§2 and 1318; 1314; see 3.1), but this should not be done if it is not for the most serious delicts and 
conforming to c. 1318. 
 - Can established expiatory punishments (see 3.2) also latae sententiae for delicts with the 
characteristics described by c. 1318. 
 
3. TYPES OF PENALTIES PROVIDED FOR BY THE CIC 
 
3.1. Previous distinctions. In the norms on penalties, the CIC refers, explicitly or implicitly, to certain 
concepts and distinctions, some already mentioned, that need to be understood in order to interpret and 
apply these provisions correctly. 
 
3.1.1. Penalties “ferendae sententiae” and “latae sententiae” 
- According to c. 1314, the penalty for a delict is usually ferendae sententiae; that is to say, when the 
delict established by a law or by a precept is commited; a penal process must be initiated to impose the 
penalty by means of a judicial decision (cf. cc. 1721 ss.), or the administrative procedure (cf. c.1720) in 
order to impose it by means of a penal decree (see 2.4.2.1; 
- However, in very serious cases and always expressly (cf. 1314; 1318), the law or the precept 
establishing it (see 2.4) may provide that the penalty be latae sententiae. In these cases the law itself applies 
the penalty ipso facto - without the need for impose it through a decision, because it is already given (lata) 
by the norm - as soon as the violation occurs, always with the other requirements established by the law 
(cf. 1321; 1324 §3). 
 
3.1.2. Indeterminate penalties and facultative penalties:  
-  A penalty is called indeterminate (cf. c 1315 §2) when the penal law, in establishing a delict, 
establishes (using the formula “iusta poena puniatur”, or similar ones) that such conduct will be punished, 
but does not specify - or does so only to a certain extent, i.e., saying what kind of penalty would be 
appropriate. Therefore, if the particular law has not previously determined (in general) a penalty that the 
universal law establishes as indeterminate (cf. c. 1315 §3), the judge or superior must determine it in the 
sentence or decree by which the penalty is imposed for that delict (always following the indications of the 
norm that establishes it and the general norms of the CIC). 
- The penal precept, as indicated above, cannot threaten with an indeterminate penalty (cf. c.1919 
§1). 
- A penalty is facultative (cf. c 1315 §3), if the law that establishes the delict does not use a preceptive 
but discretionary expression (i.e. “puniri potest”, instead of “puniatur” or “puniri debet”, etc.)  which gives 
the competent authority the power to decide, by law, whether or not to impose the penalty after a prudent 
assessment of the circumstances of the case. 
 
3.2. Censures and expiatory penalties. The penalties provided for by canon law belong to one of 
these two types (cf. c 1312 §1). 
 - Censures are also called medicinal penalties, because they tend in a peculiar way to the offender's 
amendment (not excluding, of course, the other purposes of the penalty: see 1.2), which is clearly 
manifested in its structure and in its juridical regimen. 
 - Expiatory penalties, on the other hand, are not necessarily less grave, nor do they fail to pursue all 
the general purposes of canonical penal law, but do not have the structural bond with the offender's 
amendment that characterizes the censures. 
 
 3.2.1. Censures in general. The censures are: suspension (which can be imposed only clerics), 
interdict and excommunication. These penalties have some common characteristics: 
 - They can only be imposed on contumacious offenders (those who persist in their attitude and reject 
the means that are provided to obtain their amendment). 
 - As a consequence of the above, the imposition of a censure is invalid if the offender has not been 
previously admonished at least once to cease his contumacy, giving him a reasonable time to amend (cf. 
1347 §1). This warning beforehand is not necessary in the case of a latae sententiae censure (see 3.1.1), 
nor when the censure has been threatened by a penal precept (see 2.4.2). 
 - The assumption of this warning is different from that foreseen in c. 1339 §1 where there is a 
warning, as a penal remedy (see 3.2.3), to a person who is in the proximate occasion of committing a delict 
or to one who is suspected of having committed a delict; here the warning is given to those who have 
already and certainly committed the delict, to try to make him repent and rectify without the need to impose 
the censure and, at the same time, as a prerequisite for validly imposing it if necessary. However, the 
indications of canon 1339 §§ 1 and 3 on how to make the warning and to formally record it serve as useful 
guidance. 
- Censures cannot be perpetual, the offender has the right to be absolved (in a juridical sense) when 
he abandons the contumacy (cf. cc 1358 §1; 1347 §2). 
Censures latae sententiae are not exactly automatic, since it is required, as always, that the 
corresponding delicts are gravely imputable, an extreme that the law reinforces with specific requirements 
(see 2.3.4). For that reason, although it is possible to state abstractly that whoever commits such a violation 
incurs such a censure latae sententiae instead of stating whether a particular offender has actually incurred 
the penalty,  many times it is necessary to be able to state it officially, e.g.., in order to repair the scandal 
caused by public or notorious conduct.  In these cases, it is necessary to verify what is really the penal 
situation of the person and to declare it, after a judicial process or an administrative procedure. The same 
steps as for the imposition of the penalties ferendae sententiae should be fundamentally followed (cf. c 
1341, see 7). 
- The juridical act of declaration (sentence or decree) does not impose the penalty latae sententiae 
which, as we have seen, would already be imposed by law, if applicable: it has only declarative effects. 
However, the fact that a censure is declared or not has significant juridical consequences with respect to the 
effects (cf. cc. 1331 §2; 1332 §3), the obligatory nature of the penalty (cf. cc. 1335 and 1352 §2) and its 
remission (cf. cc. 1355-1357). 
 
3.2.1.1. Excommunication. This is the gravest censure. The offender incurring excommunication is 
affected by extensive prohibitions in essential aspects of full ecclesiastical communion: he cannot celebrate 
sacraments or sacramental; cannot receive the sacraments; cannot actively participate in worship 
celebrations; cannot perform offices, ministries or ecclesiastical duties, and cannot lawfully perform acts 
involving the power of jurisdiction (cf. c.1331 §1). 
- If the excommunication is imposed or declared (see 3.2.1), by a sentence or penal decree, the 
prohibitions provided for in c. 1331 §2, which are not given in cases of non-declared excommunication 
latae sententiae, are also added to these general effects. 
 
3.2.1.2. Interdict. Although this censure does not directly affect the juridical communion of the 
offender with the Church, nor does it prevent him from exercising other functions, it bears the same 
prohibitions as excommunication (cf. c. 1332 §1) regarding the sacraments (celebration and reception, 
sacramentals and acts of worship (with the same effect also if it is declared: cf. c 1332 §4), unless the law 
or the penal precept determines some of its effects otherwise (see c. 1332 §2). 
- It seems technically difficult to impose penalties, with the requirements of canon law, to a juridical 
person (cf. c 115), including that of interdict, because, as a collective or patrimonial subject, it cannot 
properly commit a crime, since, for example, it would be impossible to evaluate unitarily the necessary 
requirements of imputability (see 2.3) and contumacy (see 3.2.1), etc. Outside the strictly penal sphere, 
there are other possible actions in the exercise of the duty of vigilance of the competent authority on the 
life and activity of juridical persons: cf. cc. 120, 305, 318, 320, 326, etc. 
- On the other hand, individuals may incur a penalty for activities directly related to juridical persons 
(cf. c 1332 §4), above all for penal actions carried out as part of their governing bodies or representatives. 
It could also be penal to belong or register in a particular association (apart from the general assumption 
provided by c. 1374), for example, after the competent Ordinary had given a legitimate penal precept to 
prohibit it for grave causes. 
 
3.2.1.3. Suspension. This censure, which affects only clerics, prohibits either all or some acts, within 
certain limits (cf. c. 1333 §3) of the power of orders, the power of governance (including the penalty of 
invalidity of the act, if the law or the precept establish as such) (cf. c. 1333 § 2) or the rights and functions 
proper to one's office (cf. c. 1333 § 1), such as the receiving of certain goods (cf. c. 1333 § 4). 
- The law or precept can determine the scope of the suspension for specific delicts, under c. 1334. 
- Only universal or particular law - not precept - can establish a penalty of suspension latae sententiae 
without determining its extent (within the limits provided by c. 1333). In that case, it will be understood 
that the effects of the suspension are all those indicated in c. 1333 § 1 (cf. c. 1334). 
- Where that latae sententiae suspension is established, instead, by penal precept (cf. c 1334 § 1), its 
extent must always be determined (it could cover everything provided for in c. 1333 §1, but must be 
explicitly determined (cf. c. 1334 §2) and cannot be established with a generic expression, as the law.  
- The sentence or the penal decree may also determine the extent of the suspension ferendae 
sententiae in applying it (cf. c. 1334 §1). 
 
3.2.2. Expiatory penalties. These consist in the privation of some spiritual or temporal good 
legitimately imposed on a faithful (in the form of obligation, prohibition, deprivation, disqualification, 
expulsion, etc.), always in a manner consistent with the supernatural end of the Church (cf. c. 1312 §2). 
- They can only affect goods (cf.  c. 1338 §1) - faculties, rights, powers, abilities, etc. - that are subject 
to the power of the authority who establishes the penalty (i.e., the one that foresees it, which may not be the 
same as the one who imposes it). 
- Unlike censures, expiatory penalties can be perpetual or imposed for a time, determined or 
indeterminate (cf. c. 1336 §1). 
- The CIC offers a list of possible expiatory penalties, among others that could be established (cf. c. 
1312 §2). 
- Only the prohibitions mentioned in c. 1336 §1, 3° may be latae sententiae (cf. c. 1336 §2), not the 
other expiatory penalties. 
 
3.2.3. The expiatory penalty of dismissal from the clerical state. The dimissio e statu clericali (cf. c. 
290,2°) is always, by its very nature, a perpetual expiatory penalty. As has already been pointed out, it 
cannot be instituted by particular law or by precept (cf. c. 1317). The reservation to universal law (nor can 
it be chosen, at the moment of imposition of the penalty, in cases in which the law establishes an 
indeterminate penalty for a delict: see 3.1.2 and 8.4.3). 
- The legislator does not establish the obligation to impose this penalty as the first and only possibility 
for any of the delicts established in the CIC. On the contrary, he always constitutes it as the upper end of a 
scale that gradually increases the penal action, allowing it to reach the dimissio in the most serious cases. 
The canons that cover forseen cases use expressions such as: "non exclusa dimissione e statu clericali", 
"puniri potest dimissione e statu clericali", "in casibus gravioribus dimittatur e statu clericali", "gradatim 
privationibus ac vel etiam dimissione e statu clericali puniri debet, ", "aliae poenae gradatim addi possunt 
adquest ad dimissionem et statu clericali " (cf. cc. 1364 §2, 1370 §1, 1394 §1, 1395 §§1-3). 
- This way of legislating, which is logical, given the nature of the penalty, requires both prudence 
and strength at the moment of assessing the circumstances of the specific case to impose it. 
 
3.3. Penal remedies and penances. In addition to penal sanctions, c. 1312 §3 provides for the use of 
penal remedies (warning, rebuke), above all to prevent delicts; and penances, to increase a penalty or to 
replace it in certain cases. The decision to apply a  penal remedy or a penance must be adopted by decree 
(cf. § 1342 §1). 
 
3.3.1. Penal remedies in general. The warning (cf. c. 1339 §1) and the rebuke (cf. c. 1339 §2) are the 
competence of the Ordinary, who can designate another person to carry them out. 
- The warning as well as the rebuke in question here, in addition to measures of pastoral solicitude, 
are formal acts which can acquire juridical relevance in different cases and for this reason must always be 
documented (cf. c. 1339 §3), without necessarily having to be public. The formal character distinguishes 
these two penal remedies from other admonitions or indications that the Ordinary could do to the faithful, 
clerics or not, about his conduct in any matter, without any special record of them. In addition, penal 
remedies always refer to situations more or less close to delictual behavior. 
 - The CIC does not specify the procedure to be followed to satisfy the requirement that there be 
some documentary evidence of these penal remedies; thus there can be several possibilities. 
 - For example, the Ordinary, or the person designated by him, may summon the person concerned 
and give him the text of the warning or rebuke to be read his presence. Once it is read and the necessary 
terms are clarified, they both must sign it, indicating the date.  If it is anticipated that this procedure may 
present difficulties (e.g. because the person refuses to sign), or if it is to be done orally, an action of some 
notary would be necessary, in addition to the Ordinary or the person designated by him, to lend faith to 
what was acted upon. The document should be kept in the secret archive of the curia (cf. c 489). 
 
3.3.1.1. The warning. This is indicated, firstly, as a preventive measure in cases where someone is in 
a proximate occasion of committing a delict (cf. c. 1339 §1). 
- The Ordinary must assess prudently (with criteria analogous to employed in morality) if a behavior 
can be qualified as a proximate occasion of committing a delict. It is not necessary, however, to carry out a 
special investigation for it, since this does not involve a penalty: it would be sufficient to have the prudent 
provision that a particular conduct, if not rectified, could end up leading to some delict, i.e.; against the 
faith, or against specific obligations of an office. In fact, the effectiveness of this remedy will depend on 
whether it is used on time and with diligence when there is reasonable cause, without risking that the delict 
was committed for fear of making a mistake or for a disproportionate anxiety of certainty. 
- Canon 1339 §1 provides that warning may also be used in other cases where, once the preliminary 
investigation of a possible delict has concluded (cf. c.1717, see 6), the Ordinary, according to c. 1718 §1, 
1°, considers that it is not possible to go ahead with a process or an administrative proceeding for the 
imposition of the penalty (i.e., because he anticipates that it would not be possible to prove the delict and 
the accused would have to be acquitted), but nevertheless has the serious suspicion that the investigated 
may have committed a delict. In these cases, the formal warning has the function of stopping a possible 
delictual conduct, or avoiding that it happen again. 
 
3.3.1.2. The rebuke. Canon 1339 §2 provides rebuke or correction for cases in which the conduct of 
someone causes scandal or serious disturbance of order. 
- Since the correction must be appropriate to the characteristics of the person and of the fact, when  
an external conduct is involved which, without being delictual, causes scandal, the Ordinary must consider 
if it is opportune to counteract with giving a proportionate publicity to the fact of correction or even to its 
content or any of its terms, in addition to leaving the documentary acts as indicated (see 3.3.1). 
- Nothing prevents that both correction and warning be employed - even in the same act, but always 
distinguishing these two penal remedies in the document in which they are communicated, since the same 
conduct of a person may include aspects that have already passed that necessitated the first as well as other 
future or ignored aspects (the proximate occasion of committing a delict if not rectified, or the above-
described suspicion: see 3.3.1.1) that appropriately necessitate the second according to law. 
 
3.3.2. Possible use of a penal precept as a penal remedy. If the warning and corrections made to 
someone, even repeatedly, have been ineffective and it is foreseeable that they will continue being so, the 
Ordinary could issue a penal precept (see 2.4.2), in which he should stipulate in detail what the person 
concerned has to do or avoid doing, and establishes at the same time the penalty that he will incur in case 
of disobedience. 
If any of the behaviors to be avoided or corrected are already typified as a delict under the law, the 
penal precept shall be limited to spell out the provision in that respect (determining, if it is the case, the 
penalty undetermined by the law). On the other hand, for other scandalous behaviors, or those that may 
constitute a proximate occasion of committing a delict, etc., but not previously classified as a delict, the 
penal precept may establish penalties, always determined (see 3.1.2). The same precept can refer to various 
behaviors, recalling for some the penal consequences already provided for by the law and establishing for 
others the consequences that may be incurred upon the interested party if he does not obey the precept 
concerning them. 
 
3.3.3. Penances. According to canon 1340 §1, these consist of a mandate to perform some work of 
charity, piety or religion (e.g., alms, a time of retreat, a certain reading, a few prayers, etc.). 
- They can be imposed in the external forum (that is to say, on the margin of the sacrament of penance 
as an internal sacramental forum, and of the other cases involving the non-public exercise of the power of 
governance (cf. c. 130), unless they are for occult transgressions (cf. c. 1340 §2) that are neither public nor 
notorious. 
- For occult transgressions, penances can only be imposed in the internal (sacramental or not), since 
otherwise it would run the risk of defaming the person concerned (this does not mean that the acts required 
to be performed must be internal or hidden, but the imposition of penance - that is, the reason why the 
subject is going to perform these acts - is not done with the publicity that acts of authority usually have, 
according to the nature of each one). 
- Penances can be added to penal remedies, according to canon 1340 §3.   
- They can be used to substitute a penalty in cases provided by the law, when, that penalty is 
considered unnecessary or disproportionate due to the circumstances involved and the dispositions of the 
offender (cf. cc. 1343, 1344, 2°, 1348). 
- In some cases, they may be added to a penalty (cf. c. 1312 §3), i.e., with the intention of 
strengthening its effectiveness to seek the amendment of the offender, or also to aggravate it when, taking 
into account the circumstances, the penalty provided by the law is in some way insufficient or less effective. 
- Lastly, they can be imposed upon remitting a censure (cf. c. 1358). 
 
4. MAIN DELICTS TYPIFIED IN CANON LAW 
 
4.1. Goods protected by penal law. The delicts that canon law typifies, while envisaging the penalties 
for each of them, are grouped around certain ecclesial values that the legislator wants to protect especially, 
because they are of great importance for the existence and mission of the Church. Specifically, those that 
the CIC typifies in cc. 1364 ss. focus on the three areas in which communion is juridically expressed (cf. c. 
205) and on some fundamental aspects of human and Christian dignity. The so-called delicta graviora, 
which include the most serious delicts against the faith and committed against morality or in the celebration 
of the sacraments, are reserved for the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and are typified in part 
by the CIC and in part by the Motu proprio Sacramentorum Sanctitatis Tutela [SST], to which it shall be 
referred when appropriate. - This guide simply lists, by way of a list, the main delicts identified, indicating 
which are reserved to the Holy See and in what aspect, since what is reserved is, on the one hand, the 
competence to know judicially or administratively how to punish the delict (or declare it, if it is punished 
with a penalty latae sententiae: see 3.2.1); and on the other hand, the competence to remit or lift the sentence 
already imposed according to law ("reserved censures", cf. c. 1354 §3). - For the detailed discernment of 
the specific assumptions - the delictual types, as will be said, are subject to strict interpretation and cannot 
be extended by analogy: see 7.1 -, and will reference the most common commentaries on the corresponding 
canons and the manuals cited in the brief bibliography included at the end of this guide. 
4.2. Delicts established in the CIC and in the SST. To structure the list minimally, the categories with 
which the CIC groups the delicts will be used, adding in each group, if applicable, the delicts or specialties 
that the SST adds. 
 
4.2.1. Delicts against religion and the unity of the Church:  
- Apostasy, heresy and schism (cf. cc. 756 and 1364, SST, article 2).  
- Forbidden communicatio in sacris (cf. cc. 844 and 1365). Conviction of the delict of concelebrating 
with ministers of ecclesial communities who do not have the apostolic succession or recognize the 
sacramentality of the priesthood is reserved to the CDF (see SST, article 3 § 1, 4).  
- Allowing children to be baptized or educated in a non-Catholic religion (cf. c.1666).  
-Profanation of consecrated species, consisting of throwing them to the ground deliberately and with 
grave contempt or taking them or holding them for a sacrilegious purpose (cf. c. 1367).  The knowledge of 
these delicts is reserved to the CDF (see SST, article 3 § 1, 1). The M.p. also typifies the delict of 
consecrating a species or both outside the Mass with a sacrilegious purpose (cf. SST, article 3 § 2). The 
declaration and the remission of the corresponding censure of excommunication latae sententiae are 
reserved to the Apostolic See.  
- Perjury before the ecclesiastical authority (cf. c. 1368).  
- Using a show, a public meeting or a means of communication to blaspheme, to seriously attack 
good morals, to insult religion or the Church, or to arouse hatred or contempt against them (cf. c. 1369). 
 
4.2.2. Delicts against ecclesiastical authorities and against the freedom of the Church:  
- Attack against the Roman Pontiff. Remission of the censure of excommunication latae sententiae 
is reserved to the Apostolic See (cf. c.1370 § 1).  
- Attack against a Bishop (cf. c.1370 § 2). "Physical violence against a cleric or against a religious 
or a religious, in contempt of faith, of the Church, of ecclesiastical power or of the ministry" (cf. c. 1370 § 
3).  
- Stubborn teaching of a doctrine condemned by the Roman Pontiff or by an Ecumenical Council (cf. 
c. 1371, 1º).  
- Obstinate rejection of a doctrine definitively proposed by the Roman Pontiff or by the College of 
Bishops on faith and customs, without retracting after having been admonished by the Apostolic See or by 
the Ordinary (cf. c. 1371, 1º). 
 - Disobedience to the legitimate mandate or prohibition of the Apostolic See, of the Ordinary or of 
the Superior, which persists after the subject has been admonished (cf. c. 1371, 2). 
- Making recourse to the Ecumenical Council or to the College of Bishops against an act of the 
Roman Pontiff (cf. c.1372).  
- Publicly inciting among subjects animosities or hatred against the Apostolic See or an Ordinary 
because of some act of power or ecclesiastical ministry, or provoking disobedience against them (cf. c. 
1373). 
- Joining an association that works against the Church (cf. c. 1374).  
- Promotion or direction of an association that works against the Church (cf. c. 1374).  
- Impeding the free exercise of the ministry, of an election or of ecclesiastical power (cf. c. 1375). 
- Impeding the legitimate use of ecclesiastical goods (cf. c. 1375). 
- Intimidating an elector, one elected, or one who exercise ecclesiastical power or ministry (cf. c. 
1375). 
- Profanation of a sacred object, movable or immovable (cf. cc. 1171 & 1376). 
- Alienating ecclesiastical goods without the permission prescribed by the law (cf. cc. 1257, 1291 ss 
and 1377). 
4.2.3. Usurpation of ecclesiastical functions and delicts in its exercise:  
- Attempting the celebration of the Eucharist without being a priest. Conviction of this delict is 
reserved to the CDF (fc. c. 1378 §2, 1º; SST, art. 3 §1, 2º). 
- Simulation of the Eucharistic celebration. Conviction of this delict is reserved to the CDF (cf. c. 
1379; SST, art. 3 §1, 3º). 
- Absolving an accomplice in the sin against the sixth commandment. Conviction of this delict is 
reserved to the CDF; and the remission of the censure of excommunication latae sententiae is reserved to 
the Apostolic See (cf. c. 1378 §1; SST, art. 4 § 1). 
- Attempting to give sacramental absolution or simply listening to a sacramental confession without 
being to celebrate it validly. Conviction of this delict is reserved to the CDF ((cf. c. 1378 §2, 2º; SST, art. 4 
§1, 2º). 
- Simulation of the sacramental absolution.  Conviction of this delict is reserved to the CDF (cf. c. 
1379; SST, art. 4 §1, 3º). 
- Solicitation of a confessor to a penitent during the confession, on the occasion, or under the pretext 
of it to solicit him or her to commit a sin against the sixth commandment (cf. c. 1387). If the solicitation is 
to commit a sin with the confessor himself, the conviction of the delict is reserved to the CDF  (cf. SST, art. 
4 §1, 4º). 
- Direct or indirect violation of the sacramental seal by the confessor (cf. c. 1388 §1).  Conviction of 
both of these delicts is reserved to the CDF; the penalty of the first is the censure of excommunication latae 
sententiae reserved to the Apostolic See (cf. SST, art. 4 §1, 5º).  
- Violation of the secret of the confession by the interpreter and by those who, in some other way, 
have knowledge of the sins from the confession (cf. c. 1388 §2). 
- Recording by some technical means or revealing with malice, through the means of communication, 
the words of the confessor or of the penitent, whether a true or feigned confession, of oneself or of another 
person. Conviction of this delict is reserved to the CDF (cf. c. 1388; SST, art. 4 §2). 
- Simulation of the administration of a sacrament of another mean not specifically typified (cf. c. 
1379). 
- Celebration or reception of a sacrament with simony (cf. c. 1380). 
- Usurpation of an ecclesiastical office or illegitimate retention of the office after its privation or 
cessation (cf. c. 1381). 
- Episcopal consecration (active or passive) without papal mandate.  Remission of the censure 
excommunication latae sententiae incurred by this delict is reserved to the Apostolic See (cf. c. 1382). 
- Ordaining without legitimate dimissorial letters someone who is not his subject, and receiving the 
ordination in these circumstances (cf. cc. 1015 & 1383). 
- Attempting to ordain a woman.  Conviction of this delict is reserved to the CDF. Remission of the 
censure of excommunication latae sententiae incurred by those who commit it is also reserved to the 
Apostolic See (cf. SST, art. 5). 
-Illegitimate exercise of a priestly function or of another sacred ministry, by some mean not 
specifically typified (cf. c. 1384).   
- Illegitimately making a profit with the stipends of the Mass (cf. c. 1385). 
- Bribery of those who exercise a function in the Church, with promises or offerings, so that he will 
do or omit something illegitimately (cf. c. 1386). 
- Accepting the indicated briberies in the first place (cf. c. 1386). 
- Abuse of an ecclesiastical power or function (cf. c. 1389 §1). 
  
  
